Italy Edges Through to Set Up Final with Spain

It's the unpredictability that makes football attractive; even though at last the better team won. It was a well-anticipate tactical battle between the two sides. After 90 minutes of excitement, we have indeed enjoyed a good one.

With two days and thirty minutes less recovery time, Prandelli did not restore Motta back in the lineup but stuck with the diamond four that crushed England in the Quarter Finals. The return of Chiellini was timely against a free-flowing Germany side.

Joachim Low dropped Thomas Muller for Toni Kroos, as he knew they needed more possession and flair to penetrate the solid Italian defence. There were debates over starting Mario Gomez or Miroslav Klose. Unarguably, the former was chosen for his physical presence.

Before one's tactical excellence was being appreciated, Italy nearly destroyed herself. The first 20 minutes was sloppy, sluggish and clumsy. Andrea Pirlo saved Buffon with his error in judgement in a German corner; Barzagli’s rebound off Buffon’s parry was just two inches away from goal; Bonucci even hit a long pass straight at the back of De Rossi.

If Spain were to beat Italy, the key might lie in the first half of first half. When their nerves have settled, their class and experience still ranks in the first tier among top international teams. Another great diagonal pass from Pirlo and Cassano’s aerobatic turn around the young Hummels brought them the lead. Balotelli capitalized on a cheap error by Germany in defending counter attack from corner clearance to double the lead.

Italy did look like they were favourites, because all they had to do for the rest of the game was defend --- their proudest strength in football.

Montolivo was the star in first half. Although failing to fire a shot in an open opportunity, he bridged between midfield and forward in style and gave his team everything after the missed penalty against England. He repaid the faith of Prandelli and shone in the trequartista role.

On the other hand, Podolski was a huge disappointment, whereas Mesut Ozil was squeezed to the right to make way for Toni Kroos. Ozil did indeed look much more lively in the 2^nd half back to the playmaker role, while Kroos’ involvement in the game was long shots that were threatening but not rewarding. 

A poor Germany midfield led to the substitution of Gomez in half time. The Bayern striker had little supply for 45 minutes, and the Germans needed Klose’s movement to spark off the comeback.

Inserting Reus was the right move to challenge Chiellini’s fitness level. Joined by Boateng and Khedira, Reus made instant impact on the right flank and Germany started to threaten.

Having survived the first 10 mins of the second half, Prandelli removed the exhausted Cassano and Montolivo. The introduction of Thaigo Motta allowed De Rossi to sit even deeper and to relieve Chiellini’s pressure. Thereby, Italy never looked like a side who would concede the game.

Rather than individual brilliance, it was a team effort that brought Italy through. Losing the more adventurous Maggio and Abate helped to stabilise the back four against the talented Germany, but Marchisio and De Rossi were exceptional, particularly in the last 20 minutes. De Rossi dropped back into his own box and Marchisio filled up the right back to allow extra aerial presence in the box.

Balzaretti had a fantastic tournament. He has shown his attacking ability at left back, but he was just as comfortable defending at right back. Crucial clearances, shot-blockings and interceptions were everywhere all night.

Joachim Low was a bit late in getting the team going as the Germans looked apparently different between the two halves, but Prandelli managed to gather the focus of his team when it matters. When a manager can ask Balotelli to help in defence and go at half chances, you know there is something special with him. Italy showed that they can also look fluent and danger in their possession game, but a quicker start and better finishing will be needed to stop Spain from achieving a record-breaking hat-trick of international tournament victories.

How England 4-4-2 has fallen apart

The semi-finalists of Euro 2012 have one thing in common – employing a 4-3-3 formation that affords an extra central midfielder. It has not only become a trend but more of a blueprint for success in modern football. Yet a mere two months to prepare for the Euros, Roy Hodgson could not help but fall back to his comfort zone by employing the 4-4-2 formation which he has used in West Bromwich Albion, also a formation that most England players are familiar with.

While undoing Fabio Capello’s hard work in importing the 4-3-3 or semi 4-5-1 to England in the last two years, Hodgson could have done better to reduce the risk of backfiring from the reverse of tactics as his 4-4-2 never looked commanding. 

The main attacking threat of the 4-4-2 formation comes from the flanks. Wingers and overlapping fullbacks conspire on the flanks and deliver to the two forwards up front. A combination of energy and technique from the side players is vital for duly carrying out defending and attacking duties. The pair of central midfielders must also be energetic and marauding as their main responsibility lies in protecting the back four as well as transiting defence to attack. When opponents may well field three central midfielders nowadays, the ability to hold on to possession is also desired.

The 03/04 team of Arsenal, famously dubbed ‘The Invincibles’, was an exemplary illustration of the 4-4-2 formation. Lauren and Ashley Cole looked tireless and consistent going up and down while Ljungberg and Pires kept their opposing full backs on their toes all the time. Vieira and Gilberto Silva were not only strong shields in the middle of the park but they were able to contribute in attacking moves as well. The strike force of Bergkamp and Henry was just exceptionally complementary.

As Arsene Wenger failed to find proper players to fulfil the 4-4-2 formation, he has turned to the more popular 4-3-3 in recent seasons. However it was England that stayed with 4-4-2. In order to make up for the disadvantage in central midfield compared to 4-3-3, there are of course tactical remedies, such as 1) playing a no. 9.5 striker to drop back; 2) employing defensive wingers; 3) using the central midfield pair to make extra runs and cover the deficit; 4) playing a higher up defensive line.

It was evident Hodgson did ask a striker to drop back, although Rooney seemed to have roam away quite often to attack. The England manager fielded the defensive James Milner and also asked Ashley Young to help Ashley Cole with defensive duties but sacrificed significantly in attack. Yet with Parker and Gerrard both not in their prime days of career, England technically gave in to the -1 man advantage in midfield. A high defensive line was not always practised either as Terry and Lescott are never known to be quick. With this squad selection, the 4-4-2 simply doesn’t work, except for the time against Sweden when Theo Walcott provided an impetus after coming off the bench to unleash the attack from the sidelines.

It's not their fault of being old

Perhaps even Hodgson himself was not convinced that his midfield duo were capable of winning the midfield battle, attacking wingers like Walcott, Oxlade-Chamberlain and Downing could only be left on the bench while nine players defended in their own half, giving away a lot of ground. This then leads us to another question – central midfield candidates.

If Hodgson was going for a hardworking and tenacious pair, why was Phil Jones not used for a single second to relieve some of the tired legs? The way to minimise physical exertion is to keep possession and while regulars in the Capello era Lampard and Barry were injured, Paul Scholes and Michael Carrick, who ran the central midfield successfully in Manutd’s 4-4-2, were not even approached nor considered but the ever-looking-confused Henderson was instead called up.

The pair who may possess the missing ingredients for England

Cesare Prandelli also had 23 players in his squad but he was able to find out the shortfalls of Italy’s performance and rectify them by altering formations and the selection of players. England, on the other hand, may be disillusioned by their 1^st place finish in group stage and hence failed to acknowledge the inadequacy of their formation. Should they win the penalty shootout (don’t get me started on how obviously they played for the shootout), Mesut Ozil would just be, if not more severe, tearing the England defence apart humiliatingly.

Roy Hodgson Has to Take Some Blame

Roy Hodgson has the best excuse in the world for any failures in the tournament; does it mean there was nothing more he could do?

a)    Tactical flaws: To ask Parker and Gerrard, both in their 30s, to perform consistently in the central midfield of the 4-4-2 is demanding with consecutive matches within 3 days. Coming to the tournament to play defensive football, the very last thing the British expect is probably leave their fate to penalties. Unfortunately, this was Hodgson’s plan. In fact, the best game they had played in the tournament was the 2^nd half vs Sweden when they were 1-2 down, because they let their football flow, and they attacked. 

(b)   Squad selection: The only natural central midfielder to cover for Parker is Jordan Henderson; With Gary Cahill injured, all we saw was Lescott and Terry clearing the ball into row Z every game. Where is Rio? The reason why England failed to keep possession is because they never played their way out of defence (Keep Calm and Carry on, eh?)

(c)    Stubbornness: Public has been discussing about how poor Ashley Young had been in the tournament. In truth, he did his defensive duties duly but was only as poor as Carroll and Rooney in creating chances. If he was that poor, why weren’t Chamberlain or Downing given more opportunities? Was Phil Jones’ energy and Jagielka’s solidity ever utilised? Did they think of Leighton Baines when the game was heading towards penalties? There is a reason why they allow you to pick 23 players.   

Roy Hodgson may just have two months since he accepted his proudest job in his career but a manager with such vast experience, if not ability, should and could have done much better if he is to win the hearts and hope of England again after a long reign of disappointment on national level.  Despite exiting the tournament ‘unbeaten in normal time’, uncertainty lies ahead with just two years left before the World Cup.

Van Marwijk's Schoolboy Errors

It would be harsh to say the Netherlands need a miracle to qualify but things could have turned out more satisfactory for the Euro 1988 Champions. A win over desperate-to-prove-themselves Portugal by two clear goals as well as a defeat of Denmark by the Germans would prevent a premature but worthy exit from the group stage. So how did it all go wrong?

Goal-Scoring

In 2011, the Netherlands won 5 out of 6 Euro Qualifying fixtures and scored a total of 25 goals, with the red-hot Van Persie and Huntelaar ‘The Hunter’ bagging 6 and 5 respectively. The Oranje squad also boasts a prolific Luuk De Jong, who scored 25 times in 24 matches in the Eredivisie but few would have expected the team to only have scored one goal in two group stage matches.

When the Netherlands needed goals, Van Marwijk did turn to Huntelaar but the Bundesliga top scorer was given too little time to have an impact. Elsewhere, De Jong may have fewer doubts why he starts on the bench but his coach’s decision to keep Van Persie on the pitch for both matches meant he has yet featured for his country in the tournament. Should Van Marwijk be more resolute in taking off the ineffective starting striker, his other two bench strikers may have answered his call for goals.

Oops...

Team Selection

It may not be a surprise to see Sneijder and Affelay in the usual starting line-up for the Netherlands but when you know that the former has only played a bit-part role this season at Inter and Affelay has only played for 100 minutes of competitive football since late April after being out injured for nearly 7 months, are they still worth to start, especially in the group of death? Van der Vaart, who has played 26 matches and contributed 11 goals and 7 assists in the 10/11 Premier League, had to settle for an understudy role and Affelay’s inclusion in the squad was equivocal as though form and fitness are no longer necessary requirements to be in the lineup. Had Van der Vaart started the game, whether alongside or in place of either one of them, wouldn’t there a difference?

In the crucial matchup against Germany, Van Marwijk reinstated first-choice Mathijsen at centreback but it was his first match since injuring his hamstring a week before the tournament kicked off. It was obviously not his best game, although it could be worse if Vlaar kept his place, but Boulahrouz, who played 21 league matches for Stuttgart this season and has 35 caps for his country, would be disappointed as he was completely overlooked. M’vila was a key member for Laurent Blanc’s France but he was not rushed in the squad; rarely do coaches do that right?

Van Bommel, one of the most practical midfielders the Oranje have ever produced, may have been a regular at Milan but at the age of 35, he may not be able to maintain a consistent performance in a tight group stage schedule. He was absolutely out-paced by the lively German midfield and was hauled off for Van der Vaart at half time. If Van der Vaart is to replace Sneijder in the attacking midfield role, Schaars and Strootman are good players that could offer energy and dynamics to take Van Bommel’s place as well. I hope the next time Van Bommel starts for the Netherlands, it’s not because he is the captain of the country, or because he is Van Marwijk’s son-in-law but because it’s a correct tactical decision.