While undoing Fabio Capello’s hard work in importing the
4-3-3 or semi 4-5-1 to England in the last two years, Hodgson could have done
better to reduce the risk of backfiring from the reverse of tactics as his
4-4-2 never looked commanding.
The main attacking threat of the 4-4-2 formation comes from
the flanks. Wingers and overlapping fullbacks conspire on the flanks and
deliver to the two forwards up front. A combination of energy and technique
from the side players is vital for duly carrying out defending and attacking
duties. The pair of central midfielders must also be energetic and marauding as
their main responsibility lies in protecting the back four as well as transiting
defence to attack. When opponents may well field three central midfielders
nowadays, the ability to hold on to possession is also desired.
The 03/04 team of Arsenal, famously dubbed ‘The
Invincibles’, was an exemplary illustration of the 4-4-2 formation. Lauren and Ashley
Cole looked tireless and consistent going up and down while Ljungberg and Pires
kept their opposing full backs on their toes all the time. Vieira and Gilberto
Silva were not only strong shields in the middle of the park but they were able
to contribute in attacking moves as well. The strike force of Bergkamp and
Henry was just exceptionally complementary.
As Arsene Wenger failed to find proper players to fulfil the
4-4-2 formation, he has turned to the more popular 4-3-3 in recent seasons.
However it was England that stayed with 4-4-2. In order to make up for the
disadvantage in central midfield compared to 4-3-3, there are of course
tactical remedies, such as 1) playing a no. 9.5 striker to drop back; 2) employing
defensive wingers; 3) using the central midfield pair to make extra runs and
cover the deficit; 4) playing a higher up defensive line.
It was evident Hodgson did ask a striker to drop back,
although Rooney seemed to have roam away quite often to attack. The England
manager fielded the defensive James Milner and also asked Ashley Young to help
Ashley Cole with defensive duties but sacrificed significantly in attack. Yet
with Parker and Gerrard both not in their prime days of career, England
technically gave in to the -1 man advantage in midfield. A high defensive line
was not always practised either as Terry and Lescott are never known to be
quick. With this squad selection, the 4-4-2 simply doesn’t work, except for the
time against Sweden when Theo Walcott provided an impetus after coming off the
bench to unleash the attack from the sidelines.
Perhaps even Hodgson himself was not convinced that his midfield
duo were capable of winning the midfield battle, attacking wingers like
Walcott, Oxlade-Chamberlain and Downing could only be left on the bench while
nine players defended in their own half, giving away a lot of ground. This then
leads us to another question – central midfield candidates.
If Hodgson was going for a hardworking and tenacious pair,
why was Phil Jones not used for a single second to relieve some of the tired
legs? The way to minimise physical exertion is to keep possession and while regulars
in the Capello era Lampard and Barry were injured, Paul Scholes and Michael
Carrick, who ran the central midfield successfully in Manutd’s 4-4-2, were not
even approached nor considered but the ever-looking-confused Henderson was
instead called up.
Cesare Prandelli also had 23 players in his squad but he was
able to find out the shortfalls of Italy’s performance and rectify them by
altering formations and the selection of players. England, on the other hand,
may be disillusioned by their 1st place finish in group stage and
hence failed to acknowledge the inadequacy of their formation. Should they win
the penalty shootout (don’t get me started on how obviously they played for the
shootout), Mesut Ozil would just be, if not more severe, tearing the England
defence apart humiliatingly.
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